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This study discusses whether the concept of societal security is embedded in the Rus-
sian formal and informal discourses as well as in the Russian strategic documents 
on national security and the Baltic Sea region. Particularly, the paper describes four 
paradigms of international relations (neorealism, neoliberalism, globalism and post-
positivism) and theoretical approaches to the concept of societal security formulated 
in them. On a practical plane, Russia has managed to develop — together with other 
regional players — a common regional approach to understanding societal securi-
ty threats and challenges in the Baltic Sea region. These challenges include uneven 
regional development, social and gender inequalities, unemployment, poverty, mani-
festations of intolerance, religious and political extremism, separatism, large-scale mi-
gration, climate change, natural and man-made catastrophes, transnational organized 
crime and cybercrime, international terrorism, so-called hybrid threats, disharmony 
between education systems, etc. In 2017, Russia and other Baltic countries agreed that 
the Council of the Baltic Sea States would be the regional institution to implement a 
common societal security strategy exemplified by the Baltic 2030 Agenda Action Plan.
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Introduction
The concept of societal security is relatively new for the Russian political 
discourse and is still not embedded in Russian security thinking and national 
security policies. There is no adequate translation of the term into the Russian 
language. Some scholars translate it as “social/public security” (obshestvennaya 
bezopasnost). Others prefer to use the phrase “security of the society” 
(bezopasnost obshestva), which is closer to the original “societal security” 
concept coined by Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver of the Copenhagen School 
(international relations). According to this tradition, societal security is about 
the survival of a community as a cohesive unit. Societal insecurities arise when 
Received 08.05.2021
doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2021-3-1
© Sergunin, A. A., 2021
To cite this article: Sergunin, A. A. 2021, Societal security in the Baltic Sea Region: the Russian perspective,  
Balt. Reg., Vol. 13, no 3, p. 4—24. doi: 10.5922/2079-8555-2021-3-1.
5A. А. Sergunin
“communities of whatever kind define a development or potentiality as a threat 
to their survival as a community” [1].
The understanding of the societal security concept has later been expanded 
by Buzan’s and Wæver’s followers and now covers not only existential threats 
to society but also soft security challenges, such as socioeconomic inequalities, 
social deprivation, lack of access to education, culture and telecommunications, 
environmental problems, food and water quality, etc. This study is based on 
such — enhanced — understanding of the societal security concept.
The post­Copenhagen School approaches that try to connect the notion of 
societal security to the concepts of human security, sustainability and resilience 
are slowly gaining momentum in the Russian political discourse; however, they 
are still not very popular in the academic community or among decision­makers. 
With very few exceptions, there is almost no research done on societal security in 
the Baltic Sea region (BSR) [2—4].
This study aims to examine how the societal security concept is perceived by 
both governmental actors and different Russian schools of international relations 
(IR). The paper also discusses whether this concept has become a part of the 
Russian discourse on the BSR. Moreover, Russia’s role in shaping the Council of 
the Baltic Sea States (CBSS) societal security agenda is studied.
Theoretical framework, data and methodology
This study is based on two main theoretical approaches. As far as the Russian 
formal and informal discourses on the BSR societal security is concerned, the 
sociology of knowledge approach to discourse (SKAD) by Reiner Keller is 
used [5]. SKAD interprets any discourse as a practice of power/knowledge. It, 
therefore, claims to be more than text or language­in­use analysis: it considers 
the knowledge side and the power effects of discourses, the infrastructures of 
discourse production as well as the institutional effects and external impacts on 
practice emerging out of discourses meeting fields of practices. SKAD is based on 
the assumption that discourses do not speak for themselves but are rather brought 
to life in historically situated processes of interaction and institution­building 
by social actors, and their communication (inter­) acts within pre­existing social 
fields of practice and institutional structures. SKAD places various data types 
and interpretation steps in relation to one another, for example, more classical 
research strategies of individual case analysis or case studies combined with 
detailed close analyses of textual data. In contrast to other qualitative approaches 
in social sciences, SKAD is not interested in the consistency of meaning inherent 
to one particular document of discourse per se but rather assumes that such data 
articulates some elements of discourse or maybe appears as a crossing point of 
several discourses.
This study is also based on the so­called liberal intergovernmental approach 
(LIGA), or liberal intergovernmentalism. Based on the mix of various neoliberal 
theories by Putnam, Ruggie and Keohane it was designed as a coherent theory 
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by Andrew Moravcsik [6]. Among other things, the LIGA aims at explaining 
why states with diverging and even conflicting interests as well as with different 
systems of government and economies (Russia and other BSR countries) still can 
cooperate and integrate with each other. Russia’s love­hate relations with its BSR 
neighbours represent an exemplary case from the LIGA point of view.
States’ decisions to cooperate internationally are explained by the LIGA in 
a three-stage framework: states first define national preferences, then bargain to 
international agreements, and finally create or adjust institutions and regimes 
to secure those outcomes in the face of future uncertainty. The LIGA aims at 
examining what drives national preferences, bargaining strategies and the nature 
of international institutions and regimes that emerge as an outcome of such a 
multicausal process. Regional and global integration is understood by the LIGA 
as a series of rational choices by national leaders. These choices respond to 
constraints and opportunities stemming from the socio­economic, political and 
cultural interests of powerful domestic constituents, the relative power of states 
deriving from asymmetrical interdependence, and the role of institutions in 
supporting the credibility of interstate commitments.
This study demonstrates that there are powerful domestic and international 
incentives that encourage Russian political leadership to opt for a cooperative 
rather conflictual type of behaviour in the BSR and seek solutions to the regional 
societal problems via negotiations, compromises and strengthening governance 
mechanisms and institutions (for instance, CBSS).
The data for this research are drawn from various sources:
•	 Russian national security documents and official documents related to 
Moscow’s policies in the BSR;
•	 CBSS documents;
•	 Scholarly works by Russian and international authors on societal security 
in general and in the BSR in particular;
•	 Media publications.
In dealing with various categories of sources, it is quite difficult to create a 
reliable database. Different sources can contradict each other and/or be fragmen­
tary. Available statistics is sometimes misleading or incomplete. As far as aca­
demic works are concerned, their authors differ by their methods of assessment 
and interpretation of the empirical data. That is why it is important check and 
double­check available sources in terms of their reliability as well as to compare 
them with each other to exclude unreliable or erroneous data and biased judge­
ments.
More specifically, I use three main principles to select and interpret empirical 
data:
1. Sources should be representative, i.e., they need to reflect typical rather 
than irregular developments in the Russian discourse on the BSR societal secu­
rity;
2. Preferences are given to the data that provide valuable and timely infor­
mation on Moscow’s policies in the region;
3. Priority is also given to the sources that reflect original data as well as 
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fresh/non­traditional approaches both to the Russian BSR discourse and Mos­
cow’s policies within the CBSS.
With the help of these research tools, the above­mentioned shortcomings of 
my empirical base can be successfully overcome and a set of reliable data for this 
study can be effectively created.
The Russian discourse on societal security
This discourse includes two levels. The first level is the official discourse 
shaped by various Russian doctrinal/conceptual documents. The second level 
is represented by expert and scholarly narratives on national and international 
security and includes views developed by different Russian IR schools.
Official discourse
Russia’s national security documents do not contain the societal security 
concept as such but address the related soft security problems. For example, 
the Law on Security of the Russian Federation (1992) defines the very notion 
of security, “Security is freedom from internal and external threats to the vital 
interests of the individual, society and state.” 1 In line with the Western political 
thought, the authors of the document singled out not only state and military 
security, but also the economic, social, information, and ecological aspects of it. 
In contrast to the Soviet legislation, which had focused on state or Communist 
party interests, this document stated — at least at the level of declaration — the 
priority of interests of the individual and society. It also established a national 
security system of the newly born Russian Federation. Along with the already 
existing bodies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of the Interior, 
Ministry of Security (later, Federal Security Service), Foreign Intelligence 
Service, Ministry of Environment, the Law recommended setting up a Security 
Council, Ministry of Defense, and several committees, including the Border 
Guards Committee, and so on.
However, this document was too abstract and vague to design a coherent 
national security strategy, including its societal component. It took several years 
to develop a special national security doctrine based on a complex approach to 
security, including its societal dimensions.
The first Russian national security concept, adopted in 1997, asserted that 
Russia faced no immediate danger of large­scale aggression, and that, because the 
country was beset with a myriad of debilitating domestic problems, the greatest 
threat to Russia’s security was now an internal one.2
This was a distinct departure from previous doctrines. For example, the military 
1 Yeltsin, B. 1992, The Law on Security of the Russian Federation, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 6 
May, p. 5 (in Russ.).
2 Yeltsin, B. 1997, The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, 26 December (in Russ.).
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doctrine of 1993 was based on the assumption that the main threat to Russia’s 
security was posed by external factors, such as local conflicts or territorial claims 
of foreign countries.
The 1997 concept clearly suggested that the current, relatively benign, 
international climate afforded Russia the opportunity to direct resources away 
from the defense sector and towards the rebuilding of the Russian economy.3 In 
general, it placed this rebuilding effort in the context of continued democratization 
and market development. In particular, the document focused on the dangers 
posed by Russia’s economic problems, which were described frankly and at 
length. The concept highlighted a number of major threats to economic security, 
such as a substantial drop of production and investments; destruction of the R&D 
capacity; disarray in the financial and monetary systems; shrinkage of the federal 
revenues; growing national debt; Russia’s overdependence on the export of raw 
materials and import of equipment, consumer goods and foodstuff; brain drain, 
and uncontrolled flight of capital.
The document also pointed to internal social, political, ethnic and cultural 
tensions that threatened to undermine both the viability and the territorial 
integrity of the Russian state. Among these, it stressed social polarization, 
demographic problems (in particular, decline in birth rates, average life 
expectancy, and population), corruption, organized crime, drug trade, terrorism, 
virulent nationalism, separatism, deterioration of the health system, ecological 
catastrophes, and disintegration of the ‘common spiritual space’. In fact, the 
1997 doctrine identified Russia’s societal security agenda without the use of the 
societal security concept itself.
The new version of the national security concept adopted by Vladimir Putin 
after his coming to power in 2000, in principle retained the focus on internal 
threats to Russia’s national security and kept the description of societal security 
challenges similar to the those conceptualized in 1997, although some external 
threats, such as NATO’s eastward enlargement and its aggressive behaviour on 
the Balkans were also identified. The 2000 doctrine linked the internal threat of 
terrorism and separatism (clearly with Chechnya in mind) to external threats: it 
argued that international terrorism involved efforts to undermine the sovereignty 
and territorial integrity of Russia, with a possibility of direct military aggression. 
However, in dealing with these threats the document called for international 
cooperation.4
The novelty of the national security strategy (NSS) adopted by President 
Dmitry Medvedev in 2009, was its introduction of the system of indicators to 
characterize the state of affairs in the field of national security. This system of 
indicators included the following parameters: (a) level of unemployment; (b) 
3 Yeltsin, B. 1997, The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, Rossiyskaya 
Gazeta, 26 December (in Russ.).
4 Putin, V. 2000, The National Security Concept of the Russian Federation, Nezavisimaya 
Gazeta, 14 January, p. 4 (in Russ.).
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decile coefficient; 5 (c) consumer price increase rates; (d) external and national 
debt as a percentage of the GDP (%); (e) governmental spending on health care, 
culture, education and research as a percentage of the GDP; (f) rates of annual 
modernization of weapons, as well as military and special equipment; (g) supply 
rates for the country’s demand for military and engineering personnel.6
Although these indicators were incomplete, the very idea of using them to 
monitor the national security system was innovative and relevant. The NSS­2009 
anticipated the possibility of regular review and update of the indicator system.
On December 31, 2015, Russian President Vladimir Putin approved a new 
NSS. The doctrine paid considerable attention to the internal aspects of Russia’s 
security. In particular, security threats such as terrorism, radical nationalism and 
religious fanaticism, separatism, organized crime and corruption were identified.
To mitigate the risks listed above, Russia should seek economic growth, 
development of the country’s R&D capacity, “the preservation and augmentation 
of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values as the foundation of Russian 
society, and its education of children and young people in a civil spirit”.7 This 
included “the introduction of a system of spiritual­moral and patriotic education 
of citizens”.
On July 21, 2020, President Putin signed a decree “On National Development 
Goals of the Russian Federation for the Period up to 2030”. Three of the five 
national goals are related to societal security: (a) taking care of the population, its 
health and well­being; (b) opportunities for self­realization and development of 
peoples’ talents, and (c) comfortable and safe environment.
The 2020 decree introduced some specific indicators to evaluate progress in 
the implementation process. For example, the goal of a comfortable and safe 
environment included the following benchmarks:
•	 improving the living conditions of at least 5 million families annually 
and increasing the volume of housing construction to at least 120 million square 
meters per year;
5 The decile coefficient (DC) is a correlation between the incomes of 10% of the wealthiest 
and 10% of the poorest population. This coefficient reflects the level of income disparity and 
social differentiation. The DC varies from 5 to 15. Experts believe that if the country’s DC 
is more than 10, there are grounds for social instability and even an uprising. According to 
the Russian Committee on Statistics, the Russian DC for 2010 was 14 (Distribution of total 
cash income, 2020, Federal State Statistics Service, available at: http://www.gks.ru/free_doc/
new_site/population/urov/urov_32kv.htm (accessed 05.05.2020) (in Russ.).
6 Medvedev, D. 2009, National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation up to 2020, Se­
curity Council of the Russian Federation, 12 May, available at: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/docu­
ments/99.html (accessed 05.05.2020) (in Russ.).
7 Putin, V. 2015, On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation, Security 
Council of the Russian Federation, 31 December, available at: http://www.scrf.gov.ru/docu­
ments/1/133.html (accessed 05.05.2020) (in Russ.).
10 GEOPOLITICS
•	 improving the quality of the urban environment by one and a half times;
•	 making sure that at least 85% of the road network in the largest urban 
agglomerations meets regulatory requirements;
•	 creating a sustainable solid municipal waste management system that 
ensures 100% waste sorting and reduces the volume of waste sent to landfills 
by half;
•	 reducing emissions of hazardous pollutants that have the greatest nega­
tive impact on the environment and human health by half;
•	 elimination of the most dangerous objects of accumulated environmental 
damage and cleaning of most important rivers and lakes, including, first and fore­
most, the Volga river and the Baikal and Teletskoye lakes.8
Despite the fact that some of these indicators look too technocratic and 
quite unachievable, the 2020 decree still sets the state authorities a strategic 
development vector that allows them to address and solve the most significant 
problems related to societal security.
On July 2, 2021, President Putin approved a new NSS that retained the 2020 
decree’s approach to the societal security agenda.9 It is noteworthy that the new 
strategy, along with the national security concept, actively uses the social/public 
security concept although it is still different from the societal security concept. 
This document contains a detailed description of the threats and challenges to 
Russia’s public security. In addition to the traditional threats and challenges, 
the NSS-2021 identifies such problems as the negative consequences of climate 
change for the Russian society and cyber threats occurring both from within Russia 
itself and from outside. Special attention is paid to the epidemiological safety of 
the population, which is, obviously, a reaction to the COVID­19 pandemic. A 
characteristic feature of the new strategy is its emphasis on external sources of 
threats and challenges to Russian national security. In contrast to the national 
security doctrines of 1997 and 2000, the NSS­2021 is based on the assumption 
that the socio­political and economic situation in Russia as a whole is stable, and 
destabilizing factors occur from outside.
To sum up, the societal security concept is still absent in Russian official 
documents, but, at the same time, the main problems related to the sphere of 
societal security are quite comprehensively addressed: the ways and means of 
coping with these threats and challenges are determined, including the efforts of 
both the state and public institutions.
8 Putin, V. 2020, Decree “On National Development Goals of the Russian Federation for the 
Period up to 2030”, 21 July, President of Russia, available at: www.kremlin.ru/events/presi­
dent/news/63728 (accessed 05.05.2020) (in Russ.).
9 Putin, V. 2021, Decree “On the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation”, 2021, 
2 July, no. 400. http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/File/GetFile/0001202107030001?type=pdf 
(accessed 05.05.2020) (in Russ.).
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Russian IR schools
Russian IR schools significantly differ from each other by their 
perceptions/approaches to societal security.
The Russian neorealist school hardly acknowledges the very concept of 
societal security, preferring to use a relatively traditional notion of social/public 
security. This school tends to interpret social/public security as a component/level 
of national security which consists of individual, social, and state security. 
The neorealists identify the following threats to social/public security both in 
Russia and the BSR: socio­economic disparities/inequalities, poverty, low living 
standards, poor social security system, street violence and crime, corruption, 
alcoholism and drug addiction, inefficient health care, environment degradation, 
political, ethnic and religious extremism, separatism, threats to information 
security, cultural integrity and traditional moral and family values, etc. [7; 8; 9] 
As mentioned above, these concerns have been reflected in the Russian national 
security documents since the 1990s because they have been developed under the 
influence of the dominant neorealist school.
The Russian neoliberal IR paradigm has several sub­schools as regards the 
understanding of the societal security concept. One interpretation is based on 
the assumption that societal security is indebted to the human rights tradition 
(the ideas of natural law and natural rights). This approach uses the individual 
as the main referent and argues that a wide range of issues (i.e., civil rights, 
cultural identity, access to education and healthcare) are fundamental to human 
dignity. The liberals argue that the goal of societal security should be to build 
upon and strengthen the existing global human rights legal framework [10; 11; 
12, p. 274—286; 13]. This sub­school focuses on ethnic, religious, cultural and 
sexual minority rights, believing that, in a healthy society, minorities should be 
protected and have a full freedom of expression. Neoliberals both nationally and 
globally heavily criticize the Russian government for its inability to effectively 
implement this concept. They also believe that the best safeguard against societal 
challenges and threats is a well­developed civil society and its institutions, which 
are currently lacking in present­day Russia.
Another branch of Russian neoliberalism views societal security as a synonym 
of community security. According to this sub­school, societal security means 
societal resilience, namely securing the key elements of a society — economic 
equality, reflexive cultural traditions and social justice — through robust civic 
engagement. The community’s security agenda also includes migration, migrants’ 
integration into society, multiculturalism, minority rights, social cohesion. This 
version of neoliberal thinking pays much attention to the security of the Russian 
ethnic communities in the Baltic States [14; 15]. On the other hand, this sub­
school examines how resilient the ethnic minorities, such as the Ingrian Finnas 
[16] and Setu [17], are in the Russian North­West.
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Another neoliberal sub­school prefers a broader vision of societal security, 
trying to equalize it with the human security concept put forward by the UN 
[18]. They accept the UN Development Programme (1994) definition of human 
security, which includes seven components: economic security; food security; 
health security; environmental security; personal security; community security; 
and political security.10
According to this sub­school, the BSR has unique features, which are formed 
around its natural environment — the environment that is distinct from that of 
any other region. Neoliberals believe that the entire BSR community shares some 
norms and values, which provide them with the incentive for a cohesive society 
[19; 20]. However, society is affected both positively and negatively due to the 
ongoing and rapid changes, mainly resulting from the geopolitical, geoeconomic 
and ecological dynamics in the region and its neighbourhood. While some of 
the changes bring new opportunities for the BSR, others adversely affect the 
community as socio­environmental factors and cultural integrity forming the 
society is threatened.
According to this sub­school, societal challenges are widespread and cross­
cutting, are shared to different extents by the entire population of the region across 
the borders that separate them in the states of the BSR. This situation, therefore, 
calls for a regional assessment of the specific and diverse needs and aspirations 
of the population beyond those of its respective government.
The Russian globalist school challenges both the narrow understanding of 
societal security as public security, suggested by neorealists and the neoliberal 
legalist and human rights approaches. At the same time, globalists agree with 
those neoliberal currents that prefer a broader understanding of societal security, 
particularly as human security.
On the other hand, this school tends to interpret societal security as a version 
of the sustainable development concept [21]. They argue that economic growth is 
insufficient to expand people’s choice or capabilities; and that health, education, 
technology, the environment, and employment should not be neglected. At the same 
time, the lack of human security has adverse consequences on economic growth, 
and therefore development. Globalists underline that imbalanced development 
that involves horizontal inequalities is an important source of conflict. Therefore, 
vicious cycles where the lack of development leads to conflict and, subsequently, 
to the lack of development, can easily emerge. Likewise, virtuous cycles are also 
a possibility, with high levels of security leading to development, which promotes 
further security in return.
10 United Nations Development Program, 1994, Human Development Report 1994: New Di-
mensions of Human Security, Oxford University Press, New York, p. 24—33, available at: 
http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/reports/255/hdr_1994_en_complete_nostats.pdf  (ac­
cessed 05.05.2020) (in Russ.).
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However, over the last decade, the so­called integrated approach to sustainable 
development principles and strategies has gained momentum in the Russian 
academic community [22]. According to this approach, sustainable development 
is conceptually broken into three constituent parts: environmental, economic and 
social.
The Russian experts identify the following dimensions of Moscow’s 
sustainable development strategy in the BSR:
•	 Economic dimension of sustainable development includes sustainable 
economic activity and increasing prosperity of the BSR communities; sustain­
able use of natural resources (including living resources); development of trans­
port infrastructure (including aviation, marine and surface transport), information 
technologies and modern telecommunications.
•	 Environmental dimension has the following priorities: monitoring and 
assessment of the state of the environment in the BSR; prevention and elimina­
tion of environmental pollution in the region; the Baltic Sea marine environment 
protection; biodiversity conservation in the BSR; climate change impact assess­
ment in the region; prevention and elimination of ecological emergencies in the 
BSR, including those relating to climate change.
•	 Social dimension includes the health of the people living and working 
in the BSR; education and cultural heritage; prosperity and capacity­building for 
children and the youth; gender equality; enhancing well­being, eradication of 
poverty among BSR people [23].
The Russian post-positivist school does not suggest a unified approach to 
societal security. For example, post­modernism, the most radical sub­school of 
post­positivism, heavily criticized the ‘positivist’ security concepts but did not 
develop any security concept of its own [24].
Russian social constructivism, another post­positivist sub­school, prefers to 
interpret societal security through the concept of identity. In line with the Co­
penhagen IR school, Russian constructivists believe that state security confronts 
societal security: state security has sovereignty as its ultimate criterion, and so­
cietal security has identity [25]. According to this sub­school, societal security, 
which is socially constructed, can only be ensured if actors’ identities are formed 
in a non­confrontational way [26]. Otherwise, multiple identities clash with each 
other and do not favour a desirable level of societal security.
Сonstructivists call for a paradigmatic change of the Russian BSR discourse: 
instead of perceiving the region as a marginal and hostile source of security 
threats, the Russian state and society should see the BSR as a region having a 
considerable potential for cooperation [27; 28]. According to the Russian con­
structivists, the BSR should have a more positive and attractive image and be 
associated with the ideas of growth, prosperity and innovation. Moreover, Mos­
cow should perceive the BSR as a region of peace and stability, where different 
identities can be reconciled and harmonized. At the same time, constructivists 
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continue to monitor some negative processes and factors that still generate im­
perialistic and nationalistic sentiments within the Russian society and elites and 
impede international cooperation in the BSR [29].
To conclude the discussion on the Russian societal security debate, it should 
be noted that there are serious problems with embedding the societal security 
concept in the Russian political discourse. These problems boil down to the fol­
lowing:
•	 The Russian national security thinking is hierarchical: individual, social 
and state/national security levels are identified where state security — in reality, 
not at declarative level — is still the most important.
•	 The Russian society is not an independent social actor. Civil society is 
still in an embryonic phase and for this reason, neither the society nor an individ­
ual can be real referent objects of security.
•	 The concept of identity is too vague for most of the Russian foreign pol­
icy schools and — except post­positivists — they are not ready to interpret soci­
etal security through this prism.
•	 Societal security does not necessarily matter to individuals whose per­
sonal security is much more important.
•	 Since anti­globalism and inward­looking sentiments are relatively strong 
in Russia, resistance rather than resilience prevails in the country’s social/com­
munity psychology.
•	 Post­sovereign mentality and politics are still unpopular in Russia. Since 
both common people and the elites believe that Russia operates in a rather un­
friendly or even hostile international environment, the theme of national sov­
ereignty, which is closely related to state rather than societal security, is very 
important in the Russian political discourse.
At the same time, while not recognizing the societal security concept itself, 
the Russian IR schools, nevertheless, largely agreed in their views on the nature 
of the societal problems existing in the BSR.
Russia and the CBSS societal security agenda
Although many Russian BSR neighbours perceive Moscow as a source of se­
curity threat in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, the Kremlin insists that it has 
no aggressive intentions in the region and prefers cooperation, not confrontation. 
From the theoretical point of view, the LIGA suggests a plausible explanation 
why Moscow prefers a cooperative, non­confrontational policy line in the BSR. 
In terms of national preference formation, it should be noted that the Kremlin has 
a rather busy domestic agenda which should be given priority over the interna­
tional problems in the region.
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As mentioned above, Russian leadership realizes that most of threats and chal­
lenges to its security originate from inside rather than outside the country. These 
problems are rooted in a confluence of factors, including the degradation of Sovi­
et­made economic, transport and social infrastructure in the Russian north­west­
ern regions, the current resource­oriented model of the Russian economy, and the 
lack of funds and managerial skills in Russia to properly develop the Russian part 
of the BSR. It follows that Russia’s current Baltic strategy is of an inward­ and 
not an outward­looking nature. It aims to solve existing domestic problems rather 
than focus on external expansion. Moreover, in developing its north­western re­
gions, Moscow seeks to demonstrate that it is open to international cooperation, 
to foreign investment and know­how.
It should be noted that Russian national preferences result in a quite pragmatic 
international strategy that aims at using the BSR cooperative programs and re­
gional institutions for solving first and foremost Russia’s own specific problems 
rather than addressing some abstract challenges.
The CBSS is seen by Russia as both a centrepiece and cornerstone of the 
regional governance system, a stance which is confirmed by the Russian strate­
gic documents 11 and numerous statements of its leadership.12 Compared to other 
regional and subregional organizations, forums and programs (such as the EU, 
Nordic institutions, Northern Dimension, etc.), the CBSS is viewed by the Krem­
lin as a more representative (in terms of its geographic scope), multidimensional 
(in terms of areas covered by its activities), research-based and efficient interna­
tional entity [30; 31]. Despite the fact that ten other CBSS member­states belong 
to Western institutions that do not include Russia (NATO, EU, Nordic organiza­
tions), Moscow still feels comfortable in the Council because there it functions as 
an equal member and it can partake in the CBSS decision­making.
Moscow also sees the CBSS as an important tool for overcoming the political 
and diplomatic isolation that Western countries have tried to plunge it into. With 
the help of the CBSS, it retains its ability to influence regional socio-economic, 
political, environmental and humanitarian processes.
Despite the growing tensions between Russia and the rest of the BSR coun­
tries in the context of the Ukrainian crisis, Moscow has not abandoned multilat­
11 Putin, V. 2016, The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation, 2016, 30 Novem­
ber, available at: http://publication.pravo.gov.ru/Document/View/0001201612010045?index­
=0&rangeSize=1 (accessed 05.05.2020) (in Russ.).
12 Statement and responses to mass media by the Minister of Foreign Affairs S.V. Lavrov at 
the news conference on the results of the Council of the Baltic Sea States ministerial online 
meeting, Moscow, 19 May 2020, 2020, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
2020, available at: https://www.mid.ru/sovet-gosudarstv-baltijskogo-mora/-/asset_publish­
er/3qDBE0PYRt7R/content/id/4133375 (accessed 05.05.2020) (in Russ.); Statement by the 
First Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs V.G. Titov at the Council of the Baltic Sea States min­
isterial meeting, 20 June 2017, 2017, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, 
available at: https://www.mid.ru/sovet-gosudarstv-baltijskogo-mora/-/asset_publisher/3qD­
BE0PYRt7R/content/id/2794141 (accessed 05.05.2020) (in Russ.).
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eral diplomacy in the region, including the CBSS. Russia played a crucial role in 
the reformulation of the CBSS long­term priorities, which took place amidst the 
Ukrainian crisis. In light of an evaluation and review of the CBSS five long-term 
priorities approved at the 7th Baltic Sea States Summit, held in Riga in 2008, the 
CBSS — under the Finnish presidency (2013—2014) — decided to mainstream 
three renewed long­term priorities: Regional Identity, Sustainable & Prosperous 
Region, and Safe & Secure Region.13
Russia actively contributed to and supported the CBSS Baltic 2030 Action 
Plan (June 2017) 14 which offers a framework to support macro­regional, national 
and sub­regional implementation of the sustainable development strategy for the 
BSR. The Baltic 2030 Action Plan includes six priority focus areas, representing 
a practical way to address the complexity of the 2030 Agenda in the BSR. The 
Focus Areas are deeply interconnected and reflect a holistic approach to achiev­
ing the 2015 UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and, at the same time, 
the regional societal security agenda:
•	 Partnerships for sustainable development. Macro­regional, multi­stake­
holder, inclusive partnerships are at the core of the Baltic 2030 Action Plan. Ac­
cording to this document, all stakeholders should take responsibility for increasing 
regional cooperation and achieving sustainable development. Existing and new 
partnerships in the BSR should focus on the exchange of knowledge and the de­
velopment of innovative, concrete and practical solutions to common challenges.
•	 Transition to a sustainable economy. Transnational cooperation is crucial 
for successful transition to a sustainable economy. This focus area includes sev­
eral interconnected challenges: to increase energy efficiency and provide afford­
able clean energy, reduce waste, manage resources wisely, adopt sustainable con­
sumption and production practices and lifestyles, create sustainable agricultural 
systems, reduce water pollution and protect ecosystems, ensure productive em­
ployment and decent work for all, promote research and innovation, and support 
‘silver’, ‘circular’, ‘blue’ and ‘green’ economies. Interestingly, Moscow, whom 
the Baltic states, Denmark and Poland often accuse of ‘energy imperialism’ has 
enthusiastically supported these initiatives.
•	 Climate action. Work on climate change should integrate both mitigation 
and adaptation, which requires enhanced regional cooperation. This focus area en­
compasses several related dimensions: emergency preparedness and disaster risk 
reduction management related to climate and weather risks, monitoring emerging 
health risks, food security risks, responding to stresses in regional ecosystems, 
and other challenges. The goal in this area is to mainstream climate change ad­
13 Annual Report for the Finnish Presidency 2013—2014, 2014, CBSS, p. 28, available at: 
https://cbss.org/wp­content/uploads/2020/04/CBSS_AnnualReport_2013—14.pdf (accessed 
05.05.2020).




aptation into all planning and sectoral development processes to strengthen the 
resilience of infrastructures and society and to support the implementation of the 
UN Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction in the region. Russian sup­
port for climate change mitigation strategies was in striking contrast with Donald 
Trump’s stand on this issue and consonant with other BSR countries’ positions.
•	 Equality and social well­being for all. The BSR includes countries that 
are rated amongst the world’s most equal — but also some of the world’s most 
rapidly changing societies, moving in the direction of rising inequality. Gender 
equality and the rights of children are given special priority in this focus area. 
It also supports cooperation in the shared demographic challenges: ageing pop­
ulation, migration, economic and social inequalities, health­related challenges, 
social inclusion; and addressing crime and violence and acts of discrimination, 
which people face in the BSR.
•	 Creating sustainable and resilient cities and communities. Populations, 
economic activities, social and cultural interactions, as well as environmental and 
humanitarian impacts, are increasingly concentrated in cities, and this poses mas­
sive sustainability challenges in terms of housing, infrastructure, basic services, 
food security, health, education, decent jobs, safety and natural resources, among 
others. At the same time, supporting positive economic, social and environmen­
tal links between urban, peri­urban and rural areas — by strengthening nation­
al, macro­regional, and sub­regional development planning — is crucial. Since 
2013, Russia has been trying to introduce strategic planning principles to the ur­
ban sustainable development programs. In 2014, Moscow adopted a special law 
on strategic planning which obliged all three levels of power — federal, regional 
and municipal — to introduce development strategies that should be based on 
the sustainable development concept.15 The Russian north­western municipalities 
draw heavily on the BSR countries’ experiences in this area by implementing the 
concepts of ‘smart’ or ‘green’ cities [32].
•	 Quality education and lifelong learning for all. Rapid social and techno­
logical changes bring the need to develop an approach to quality education and 
lifelong learning throughout the BSR. This focus area includes a special empha­
sis on scientific literacy and research, STEM (science, technology, engineering 
and mathematics) education and innovation, which can support sustainable de­
velopment from an economic, social, and cultural perspective. Professional asso­
ciations such as, for example, the Baltic Sea Region University Network, where 
Russia closely cooperates with other BSR countries, are particularly useful in 
this regard.
The Baltic Agenda 2030 Action Plan provided an opportunity for harmonizing 
the CBSS policies and the EU Strategy for the BSR (EUSBSR) [33]. Moreover, 
15 Putin, V. 2014, The Federal Law, 28 June 2014, no. 172­FL “On Strategic Planning in the 
Russian Federation”, Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 28 June, available at: https://rg.ru/2014/07/03/
strategia­dok.html (accessed 05.05.2020) (in Russ.).
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this Action Plan represents not only a regional sustainable development strategy 
but also provides a useful and firm link between a regional organization and a 
global institution (UN). In other words, with the help of this Action Plan the 
CBSS is able to translate the UN global sustainability strategy to the regional 
one, which takes into account the local particularities, and better serves the BSR 
specific needs.
At their CBSS 25th anniversary meeting (Reykjavik, June 2017) the foreign 
ministers and high­level representatives highlighted further priorities for the 
Council’s sustainability/societal security strategy.16 They encouraged the CBSS 
to continue working actively to achieve tangible results within its above­men­
tioned three long­term priorities: regional identity; sustainable and prosperous 
region; and, safe and secure region. More specifically, they invited the CBSS 
to identify and launch new project activities, with a view to achieving concrete 
results within each of the following subject areas:
Sustainable development. The adoption of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development and the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change marked the 
beginning of a new era in global cooperation for sustainable development. The 
CBSS plays an important role in delivering regional responses to the global 
challenges outlined in the 2030 Agenda, including through increased cooperation 
on mitigation and adaptation to climate change. As mentioned above, the CBSS 
responded to this UN initiative by adopting the Baltic 2030 Action Plan to meet 
the global SDGs at the regional level.
Youth. The BSR countries believe their young people are the future of the 
region. Learning about, and from, each other contributes to strengthening regional 
identity. In this context, the Baltic Sea Youth Dialogue is an instrument for building 
transnational trust and mutual understanding, in particular in challenging times, 
and should provide the basis for sustainable BSR youth cooperation in media, 
education, science and the labour market.
Human trafficking. The CBSS task force against trafficking in human beings 
has been operating successfully with Russia’s active participation since 2006 and 
has earned international acclaim. The current global migration reality has led to a 
significant rise in the number of refugees and displaced persons in Europe who are 
at risk of being exploited by traffickers. Against this background, it is important 
that the task force continues its endeavours to prevent trafficking in human beings. 
Referring to the successful CBSS conference of 2017 on societal security and 
migration, the CBSS was encouraged by the foreign ministers to further promote 
cooperation on this topical issue among the BSR countries. Although for Russia 
migration currently is not a serious challenge, Moscow, being in solidarity with 
its Baltic neighbours, actively supports their efforts in this area.
16 Declaration on the Occasion of the 25th Anniversary of the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States, 2017, CBSS, 20 June, available at: http://www.cbss.org/wp­content/uploads/2017/06/
The-Reykjavik-Declaration.pdf (accessed 05.05.2020).
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Child protection. Russia participates in the CBSS expert group on children at 
risk, which has been highlighting issues of regional concern since 2002, such as 
children in alternative care, promoting child-friendly justice, preventing traffick­
ing and exploitation of children, as well as promoting the best interests of chil­
dren in migration. Child protection issues are highlighted in the 2030 Agenda as 
an important priority of the societal security strategy. The CBSS expert group has 
extensive experience from its work on child protection and is in a strong position 
to follow up on the 2030 Agenda.
Civil protection. Since 2002, the CBSS Civil Protection Network has been de­
veloping activities to strengthen resilience to major emergencies and disasters in 
the region. Increases in the intensity and frequency of extreme weather conditions 
make it important to accelerate these efforts through enhanced cooperation at all 
levels of government and in line with the objectives of the UN Sendai Framework 
for Disaster Risk Reduction. Some experts believe that this dimension of the 
CBSS activities is the most important one and tend to equate the societal security 
concept with the ability to resist natural and technogenic catastrophes in the BSR 
[34, p. 109—115; 35]. Moscow believes that it can significantly contribute to 
civil protection in the region because Russia has both a solid material­technical 
base and practical experience in this sphere.
At the same 2017 anniversary meeting, the ministers invited the CBSS to ap­
point an independent group of advisors, including civil society representatives. 
The task of the independent group was to prepare a report with recommendations 
for a vision for the BSR beyond 2020, and on the future role of the CBSS and the 
means to expand its impact as a forum for political dialogue and practical cooper­
ation in the region. The independent group (where the Russian participant played 
a prominent role) presented its report and recommendations to the CBSS for con­
sideration in June 2018. The group recommended to further use and strengthen 
the CBSS as a key platform for regional cooperation and communication as well 
as confirming three current long-term priorities as strategic goals for the foresee­
able future.17
Moscow actively partook in the discussion on the CBSS Reform Roadmap 
which was approved during the Latvian chairmanship in 2018—2019.18 Russia 
also supported the Danish presidency in its efforts to adopt revised Terms of Ref­
erence of the CBSS and of the CBSS Secretariat. Moscow was also helpful in pre­
paring a number of other important documents: Orientations for the CBSS role 
and engagement within the EUSBSR and the Northern Dimension, Operational 
Guidelines for CBSS Practical Cooperation, Guidelines for CBSS Fundraising, 
17 Vision for the Baltic Sea Region beyond 2020. Report by the Council of the Baltic Sea States 
Vision Group, 2018, CBSS, June, available at: https://cbss.org/wp­content/uploads/2020/03/
Vision­Group­Report.pdf (accessed 05.05.2020).
18 Annual Report for the Latvian Presidency 2018—2019, 2019, CBSS, available at, https://
cbss.org/wp­content/uploads/2020/03/Annual­Report­Latvia­2018—2019.pdf  (accessed 
05.05.2020).
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renewed mandate and new regional strategy for the Expert Group on Children 
at Risk 2020—2025, and new terms of reference and strategy for the Task Force 
against Trafficking in Human Beings 2020—2025.19
Even the COVID­19 pandemic was not a serious obstacle to the BSR coun­
tries’ cooperation in the CBSS framework. Some important events at the end of 
the Danish chairmanship, including the final ministerial meeting, were held on­
line but this did not prevent the ministers from evaluating the Danish presidency 
as one of the most effective. In addition to the adoption of the above­mentioned 
documents, under the Danish chairmanship, a new CBSS Director General for 
the Secretariat was appointed and the Council’s Secretariat got new premises in 
Stockholm.
While continuing to work in the context of the pandemic, Russia supported the 
main priorities of the Lithuanian Presidency programme (2020—2021):
•	 sustainable development, especially in the field of developing green in­
dustry;
•	 green and maritime tourism as an important sector in reviving region­
al economy, increasing region’s visibility, giving employment opportunities to 
young people;
•	 civil protection in the region, strengthening resilience in the region 
against major emergencies and disasters;
•	 fight against human trafficking for labour exploitation in the region, as 
well as prevention of violence against children.20
During the existence of the CBSS, Russia has always actively participated in 
various projects within the Council — environmental, infrastructural, educational 
(Eurofaculties in Kaliningrad and Pskov), youth, etc. Over the past three years, 
Russia has participated in 19 of the 46 projects initiated by the CBSS. Only three 
countries were ahead of Russia: Finland (23 projects), Sweden (23 projects) and 
Latvia (22 projects) (fig.).
Currently, Russia participates in four of the six ongoing projects:
•	 Baltic Sea Region Mobilities for Young Researchers;
•	 Young People Network for Balticness (YoPeNET);
•	 Youth Networking for Sustainable Tourism Development in the Baltic 
Sea Region;
•	 THALIA — Towards thoughtful, informed, and compassionate journal­
ism in covering human trafficking.21
19 Annual Report for the Danish Presidency 2019—2020, 2020, CBSS, available at: https://
cbss.org/wp­content/uploads/2020/10/Annual­Report­Denmark­2019—2020.pdf (accessed 
05.05.2020).
20 Lithuanian Presidency Program 2020—2021, 2020, CBSS, available at: https://cbss.org/
wp­content/uploads/2020/06/Lithuanian­Presidency­Programme­2020—2021.pdf (accessed 
05.05.2020).
21 Ongoing Projects — CBSS, 2021, CBSS, available at: https://cbss.org/psf/ongoing-projects/ 
(accessed 05.05.2020).
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Fig. Member-state participation in the CBSS projects funded by  
the Project Support Facility
Source: Project Support Facility, 2021, CBSS, available at: https://cbss.org/psf 
(accessed 05.05.2020).
Conclusions
Although societal security concept is virtually absent in Russian official 
documents and academic/expert discourse, the societal security problems — in 
various forms — are gradually gaining momentum, both at the level of practical 
policies and among scholars. The interpretation of the concept by different 
Russian schools ranges from the narrowest (communal security) to the broadest 
understanding (human security, sustainable development). This is natural for 
a polity in transition, where civil society is not mature enough, where a state­
centric approach to national security still prevails and where the individual and 
society still cannot be referent objects for security.
Although the Russian discourse on societal security is mostly inward­looking 
and related to national security format, the (Baltic) regional dimension is slowly 
unfolding in the Russian academic and policy­making community.
Despite the ongoing tensions between Moscow and the West, which reached a 
critical stage in the aftermath of the Ukrainian crisis, the BSR countries, including 
Russia, identified an almost identical set of soft security threats and challenges, 
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both to the individual countries and to the region at large. These societal security 
threats include uneven regional development, social and gender inequalities, 
unemployment (especially among the youth), poverty, manifestations of 
intolerance, religious and political extremism, separatism, largescale migration, 
inconsistencies in education systems, climate change, natural and man­made 
catastrophes, transnational organized crime and cybercrime, international 
terrorism, the so­called hybrid threats, etc.
With Russia’s participation, the BSR community has been able to develop 
common approaches for coping with societal security threats. They rely on the 
same arsenal of methods and tools for problem­solving, improving the situation 
domestically and regionally, as well as producing a forward­looking, long­term 
sustainable development strategy. The CBSS has been identified as the regional 
institution to implement a common societal security strategy as exemplified by 
the Baltic 2030 Agenda Action Plan. Although geopolitical tensions in the region 
remain strong and various countries differ in their interpretation of the societal 
security concept and sustainable development strategy, the general dynamic in 
the BSR is relatively positive and gives some grounds for cautious optimism.
References
1. Buzan, B., Wæver, O., de Wilde, J. H. 1998, Security: A New Framework for Anal-
ysis, Lynne Rienner, London/Boulder.
2. Aaltola, M., Kuznetsov, B., Sprūds, A., Vizgunova, E. (eds.) 2018, Societal Secu-
rity in the Baltic Sea region: Expertise Mapping and Raising Policy Relevance, Latvian 
Institute of International Affairs/Zinātne, Riga.
3. Ozoliņa, Ž. (ed.) 2016, Societal Security. Inclusion-Exclusion Dilemma. A Portrait 
of the Russian-Speaking Community in Latvia, Zinātne, Riga.
4. Smith, D.J. (ed.) 2005, The Baltic States and Their Region: New Europe or Old? 
Rodopi, New York.
5. Keller, R. 2013. Doing Discourse Research: An Introduction for Social Scientists, 
SAGE, Los Angeles.
6. Moravcsik, A., Schimmelfennig, F. 2009, Liberal Intergovernmentalism. In: Wie­
ner, A., Diez, T. (eds.) European Integration Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
p. 67—87.
7. Baluev, D. 2002, Sovremennaya Mirovaya Politika i Problemy Lichnostnoi Bezo-
pasnosti [Contemporary World Policy and Problems of Human Security], Nizhny Novgo­
rod State University Press, Nizhny Novgorod (in Russ.).
8. Chugayev, S. 1997, State of the Economy and Society Is the Main Threat for Rus­
sia, Says the Russian National Security Concept, Izvestiya, 19 December (in Russ.).
9. Tsygankov, P.A. 2010, Human Security Theory: Political Implications and Lessons 
for Russia, Moscow University Bulletin. Series no. 12. Political Science, no. 4, p. 80—83 
(in Russ.).
23A. А. Sergunin
10. Kozyreva, A. 2003, Human Security Concept in the Contemporary World, Oboz-
revatel’-Observer, no. 9 (in Russ.).
11. Kulagin, V.M. 2006, Mezhdunarodnaya Bezopasnost [International Security], 
Moscow, Aspect Press (in Russ.).
12. Lebedeva, M. 2006, Mirovaya Politika [World Politics], Moscow, Aspect Press 
(in Russ.).
13. Vasilchenko, O. 2016, Human Security: on a Concept. In: Akhmetov, I.G. (ed.) 
Novye Idei v Filosophii [New Ideas in Philosophy], Moscow, Buk, p. 13—19 (in Russ.).
14. Bakuntsev, A.V. 2009, The Russians in the Baltic Sea Region: the Problem of 
Self-Identification, Vestnik Tsentra Mezhdunarodnogo Obrazovaniya Moskovskogo Go-
sudarsetvennogo Universiteta. Filologiya. Pedagogika. Metodika [The Bulletin of the In­
ternational Education Center, Moscow State University. Philology. Pedagogy. Methods], 
no. 1, p. 67—69 (in Russ.).
15. Belobrovtseva, I. (ed.) 2010, Russkie v Pribaltike [Russians in the Baltic Sea Re­
gion], Moscow, Flinta/Nauka (in Russ.).
16. Bugay, N. 2017, Finny-Ingermanlandtsy. Transformatsii Etnicheskoi Obshnos-
ti: Zabvenie, Vozrozhdenie, Perspektiva [The Ingrian Finns. Transformations of Ethnic 
Community: Oblivion, Revival, Perspectives], Moscow, Akvarius (in Russ.).
17. Alekseev, Y.V., Manakov, A.G. 2005, Narod Setu: Mezhdu Rossiey i Estoniey [The 
People of Setu: Between Russia and Estonia], Moscow, Europe (in Russ.).
18. Polovina, E.V. 2015, The Problem of Definition of the Human Security Concept 
in the UN Documents, Politika, Gosudarstvo i Pravo [Politics, State and Law], no. 4 (in 
Russ.).
19. Baranovsky, V. (ed.) 1997, Russia and Europe: The Emerging Security Agenda, 
New York, Oxford University Press.
20. Gorny, M. (ed.) 2004, Publichnaya Politika: Voprosy Myagkoi Bezopasnosti 
v Baltiyskom Regione [Public Policy: Soft Security Issues in the Baltic Sea Region], 
St.  Petersburg, Norma (in Russ.).
21. Selin, V.S., Vasiliev, V.V. 2010, Vzaimodeistvie Global’nykh, Natsional’nykh 
i Regional’nykh Ekonomicheskikh Interesov v Osvoenii Severa i Arktiki [Interaction of 
Global, National and Regional Economic Interests in the Development of the North and 
Arctic], The Kola Science Center of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Apatity (in Russ.).
22. Vvedenskiy, A. 2014, Innovation Infrastructure as the Key Element of Sustainable 
Venture Ecosystem in Russia, Baltic Rim Economies, 29 April, p. 44.
23. Makarychev, A., Sergunin, A. 2017, Russia’s Role in Regional Cooperation and 
the EU Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region (EUSBSR), Journal of Baltic Studies, vol. 48, 
no. 2, p. 34—50.
24. Kapustin, B. 1996, National Interest as a Conservative Utopia, Svobodnaya Mysl 
[Liberal Thought], no. 6, p. 13—28 (in Russ.).
25. Wæver, O. 1993, Societal Security: The Concept. In: Wæver, O., Buzan, B., Kel­
strup, M., Lemaitre, P. (eds.) Identity, Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe, 
New York, St. Martin’s Press, p. 17—40.
24 GEOPOLITICS
26. Vasilieva, N.A., Chensin, V. 2011, Modernization as a Search for Russia’s New 
Identity: the Arctic Model, Vestnik Mezhdunarodnykh Organizatsiy [International Orga­
nizations Research Journal], no. 3, p. 20—26 (in Russ.).
27. Makarychev, A. 2003, Contours of Regional Identity: Testing Constructivism on 
Kaliningrad’s Ground, Journal of Eurasian Research, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 18—25.
28. Morozov, V. 2004, Russia in the Baltic Sea Region: Desecuritization or Deregion­
alization? Cooperation and Conflict, vol. 39, no. 3, p. 317—331.
29. Morozov, V. 2005, On the West’s Cunning and Its Unmaskers: Russia’s Foreign 
Policy Thought and Self­Isolation, Neprikosnovenny Zapas [Emergency Store], no. 5, 
p.  14—22.
30. Sergunin, A. 2019, The Baltic Sea region after the Ukrainian crisis and Trump: a 
Russian perspective, DIIS Report, no. 4, The Danish Institute for International Studies, 
Copenhagen.
31. Zhuravel, V., Ivanov, S. 2018, Cooperation of the Baltic Sea states in the sphere 
of regional security, Geopoliticheskiy zhurnal [Geopolitical Journal], no. 1, p. 40—46 (in 
Russ.).
32. Sergunin, A. 2019, Applying EU standards to planning Russian Arctic cities’ 
sustainable development strategies: challenges and opportunities. In: Varaksin, A.N. 
(eds.) Environmental Knowledge and Policy Innovation between East and West. Lessons 
Learned and Not? Open Science Conference Proceedings, Minsk, 28—30 May 2019, 
Minsk, p. 108—109.
33. Palmowski, T. 2021, The European Union Strategy for the Baltic Sea Region 
and accomplishments, Baltic Region, vol.13, no. 1, p. 138—152. doi: https://doi.
org/10.5922/2079­8555­2021­1­8.
34. Nikers, O., Tabuns, O. 2019, Baltic Security Strategy Report. What the Baltics 
Can Offer for a Stronger Alliance, The Jamestown Foundation, Washington.
35. Wolanin, J. 2017, Common societal security culture in the Baltic Sea Region: 
basics and the way forward, 13 December, Council of the Baltic Sea States Secretariat, 
Stockholm, available at: https://cbss.org/publications/common­societal­security­culture­
in­the­baltic­sea­region­basics­and­the­way­forward/ (accessed 15.05.2021).
The author
Prof. Alexander A. Sergunin, Department of International Relations Theory and 
History, St. Petersburg State University, Russia; Department of Political Sci­
ence, Lobachevsky State University of Nizhny Novgorod, Russia.
E­mail: a.sergunin@spbu.ru
http://orcid.org/0000­0002­4683­0611
